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Coalition building and the power index of parties in this process
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The other weaknesses of the size principle are that it does not explain real-world cabinet coalitions very well. It is inaccurate and cannot explain the emergence of the widely common minority and surplus governments.
2) Minimum size coalitions:
This theory again assumes parties would always strive for maximizing their power and thus being part of a minimal winning coalition. The difference is that according to the minimum size theory parties will always choose the most advantageous coalition for them – the one giving them the highest share of seats. That is why coalition ADE is predicted with a majority of fifty-three seats instead of some of the other coalitions that have a majority ranging from fifty-four to fifty-nine seats.
3) Coalitions with the smallest number of parties:
This theory uses one more criterion for reasoning which kind of coalition will form. Based on Michael Leiserson’s “bargaining position” it argues that parties will choose to form those minimal winning coalitions that involve the smallest number of members participating in them because “negotiations and bargaining [about the formation of a coalition] are easier to complete and hold together, other things being equal, with fewer parties.” Therefore, the theory predicts that of all the minimal winning coalitions in the table, only BE and CE will tend to form because they would be more preferred than a three-party coalition.
4) Minimal range coalitions:
In contrast to the other theories, which take into account only the size and the number of parties in coalition building, this theory considers also their policy programs and preferences. It assumes that coalitions are more likely to be formed and well maintained among parties with similar views than among those, which are far apart in this respect.
In the example above, party A is to the extreme left and party E is to the extreme right. The distance between the different parties are the “spaces” that separate them. Coalition ABC with a range of two is much more plausible than coalition ADE which includes four spaces. BCD and CE are also predicted because of the two “spaces” range.
5) Minimal connected winning coalitions
This theory was proposed by Robert Axelrod who assumes that parties will always try to coalesce with their immediate neighbors until a coalition is formed. The minimal connected winning coalitions are not necessarily minimal winning.
Zdroje: 1. Bilal, Sanoussi, Paul Albuquerque and Madeleine O. Hosli. 2001. “The Probability of Coalition Formation: Spatial Voting Power Indices”. Retrieved: April 4, 2003.
, 2. Felsenthal, D. and Moshe Machover. 1998. The Measurement of Voting Power. Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar., 3. Holler, M. 2002. “How to sell power indices”. Retrieved: April 7, 2003. , 4. Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of democracy government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: Conn. London Yale University Press., 5. Pajala, A. “The Voting Power and Power Index Website”. Retrieved: April 11, 2003. , 6. Saari, D. 2001. Chaotic Elections! – A Mathematician Looks at Voting. American Mathematical Society., 7. Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik. 1954. “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System” American Political Science Review, 48, 787-92., 8. Strom, K. “Coalition building”. In: Encyclopedia of Democracy: 255-258.